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Abstract:  
Purpose – The author aims to analyse the weaknesses of the Financial Services Authority 
(FSA) and the Bank of England during the financial crisis of 2007-2009. She aims to discover 
whether the coalition government’s proposal to a twin-peaks model is a better alternative 
to the single regulator. The focus of this paper is on micro-prudential regulatory failures in 
the UK. A comparison will be made with the twin-peaks regulatory model in Australia where 
there were no bank failures. 
Design/methodology/approach – The paper is based upon an analysis of recent papers and 
reports. Descriptive statistics are used to provide an insight into the financial ratios of the 
top banks in the UK and Australia. A comparative legal analysis between the UK and 
Australia is used to reflect the common law system used by both. 
Findings – The structure of the UK regulator was only a minor contributory factor to the 
financial crisis. The main regulatory and supervisory failures are due to organisational and 
management problems. There needs to be better information flow, co-ordination, co-
operation, engagement with banks and stricter internal controls. The new UK regulator also 
needs to be prepared for the changes on the European dimension, following the de 
Larosiere report. 
Practical implications – This paper will have policy implications for practitioners and policy 
makers on national, European and international dimensions. Changes in the European 
regulatory structure will see an emphasis on vertical regulatory co-operation. 
Originality/value – By first reviewing the weaknesses of the FSA in light of Northern Rock 
and HBOS and then comparing the FSA with the Australian regulatory model, this paper 
provides a new insight into financial regulation. 
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1. Introduction 
The UK was ranked first on the overall Financial Development Index of the World Economic 
Forum 2009. However, it was ranked 37th in financial stability. The World Economic Forum 
has recommended improvements in regulation and oversight, including official supervisory 
power in the UK (World Economic Forum, 2009). The regulatory and supervisory framework 
of the UK financial regulator is thus of importance. Regulation refers to the rules which 
govern the behaviour of banks. Supervision focuses on the oversight by the regulator to 
ensure that banks adhere to the rules (Barth et al, 2006). Regulation can be divided into 
macro and micro-prudential regulation. Macro-prudential regulation concerns the stability 
of the entire financial system. Micro-prudential regulation focuses on the regulation of 
individual organisations. In the United Kingdom, the Bank of England is responsible for 
macro-prudential regulation from 1997 till present. Responsibility for micro-prudential 
regulation is primarily the responsibility of the Financial Services Authority (FSA) but 
individual organisations are also responsible for implementing the rules. In practice, 
regulation and supervision are often intertwined. Therefore, although this author tries to 
separate the two in the paper, it is necessary to assess them together at times. Whilst this 
paper will include a discussion on the Bank of England as the macro-prudential regulator, 
the focus is on the FSA’s role as the micro-prudential regulator and supervisor.  
Ineffective micro-prudential regulation could lead to problems such as poor risk 
management, regulation and supervision; high leverage; insufficient liquidity and capital 
within banks. Liquidity, leverage and capital are all connected. Adrian and Shin (2010) 
submit that ‘aggregate liquidity is intimately tied to how hard the financial intermediaries 
search for borrowers’. In the sub-prime crisis, banks lent money to customers who had no 
realistic chance of repaying it. This is because banks had surplus capital which is costly to 
retain. During a boom, asset prices increase and balance sheets are stronger. Banks have to 
find ways to use their capital to increase leverage. According to Brunnermeier (2009), there 
were two “liquidity spirals” during the financial crisis. When asset prices drop, financial 
institutions’ capital erodes and, at the same time, lending standards and margins tighten. 
Both effects cause fire-sales, pushing down prices and tightening funding even further’ 
(Brunnermeier, 2009). These liquidity spirals lead to banks protecting their funds so inter-
bank lending decreases. Bank runs then follow and capital levels deplete. Northern Rock is a 
prime example. 
 
Much has been written on the demise of Northern Rock (Yorulmazer, 2009; Bruni & 
Llewellyn, 2009; Milne & Wood, 2008). There is a gap in the literature in that little has been 
written on HBOS. The author will review the roles of the Bank of England and the FSA in 
section 2.  Section 3 consists of an analysis of HBOS. In section 4, the author will analyse 
whether the twin-peaks model will address problems such as regulatory co-ordination; 
information sharing and conflict of interests. The paper will draw comparison from the 
Australian experience.  Section 5 is a discussion on what changes the FSA has made since 
the financial crisis. Section 6 discusses the results and makes recommendations. Section 7 
concludes the paper. 
 
 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
The UK labour government adopted the tripartite system in 1997. Under the tripartite 
system, the FSA supervises financial institutions; the Treasury is responsible for legislation 
and the Bank of England for financial stability. The justification for a tripartite system was 
that the boundaries between financial institutions have blurred. Banking, insurance and 
securities overlap. Complex group structures, innovative financial products and processes 
such as securitisation have led to the phenomenon of ‘functional despecialisation’ (Taylor, 
2009) Traditional banks adopted the ‘originate-to-distribute’ model in the late 1980s and 
boundaries between banks, insurance and securities companies have blurred. Banks and the 
shadow banking organisations have thus become increasingly interwoven. A single regulator 
would be better positioned to monitor modern financial institutions.  
 
Northern Rock is an example of ‘functional despecialisation’ and the tripartite system has 
revealed weaknesses of the FSA and the relationship between the FSA and the Bank of 
England. Northern Rock was formerly a building society. In 1997, it became a bank when it 
was listed on the London Stock Exchange. However, Northern Rock had a very unusual 
business model. It combined a traditional reliance on illiquid long-term mortgage assets 
with a reliance on innovative sources such as securitisation and the wholesale market (Milne 
& Wood, 2009). Mortgages constituted 77% of Northern Rock’s assets. At the end of 2006, 
Northern Rock issued asset-backed securities through its ‘Granite’ securitisation vehicles 
and obtained 40% of funding (Milne & Wood, 2009). Wholesale funding constituted 68% of 
Northern Rock’s liabilities whilst deposits only made up 27% of its liabilities (Goldsmith-
Pinkham & Yorulmazer, 2009).  
 
Poor financial ratios at Northern Rock between 2003-2009 should have alerted some the 
FSA. Table 1 below reveals the liquidity, debt, capital and profitability ratios amongst the 
biggest UK and Australian banks. The ratios are a five year average between the years of 
2004-2009. Northern Rock had the highest loans to deposits ratio; second highest debt to 
equity ratio, a poor capital ratio and negative profitability ratios. 
 
Name of bank Country Cash ratio 
5 year 
average 
(%) 
Debt-to-
Equity 
ratio 5 
year 
average 
(%) 
Loans to 
deposits 
ratio 5 
year 
average 
(%) 
Tier 1 
Capital 
ratio 5 
year 
average 
(%) 
Return 
on 
equity 
ratio 5 
year 
average 
(%) 
Return 
on 
assets 5 
year 
average 
(%) 
Royal Bank of 
Scotland 
United 
Kingdom 
16.68 21.10 115.22 8 9.26 -0.30 
HSBC United 
Kingdom 
44.67 16.07 96.64 8.8 7.26 0.66 
Barclays United 
Kingdom 
55.72 25.90 93.28 8.8 20.96 0.35 
Lloyds TSB United 
Kingdom 
27.14 29.85 113.86 8.5 19.15 0.60 
HBOS United 
Kingdom 
5.10 38.98 179.24 7.2 0.23 0.04 
Standard 
Chartered 
United 
Kingdom 
17.27 10.79 89.80 9.2 14.51 0.92 
Northern Rock United 
Kingdom 
8.14 76.54 242.86 -18.7 -75.46 -0.60 
Bradford & 
Bingley 
United 
Kingdom 
6.07 85.52 132.56 8.3 25.12 0.14 
Alliance & 
Leicester 
United 
Kingdom 
6.93 38.42 145.90 7.6 14.25 0.94 
Nationwide 
Building Society 
United 
Kingdom 
4.52 32.02 115.72 10.0 7.42 0.22 
Westpac 
Banking 
Corporation 
Australia 22.68 20.02 135.00 7.3 19.57 0.95 
Commonwealth 
Bank of 
Australia 
Australia 24.12 16.80 134.22 7.68 17.64 0.98 
ANZ Australia 26.49 15.09 124.34 7.74 14.54 0.89 
National 
Australia Bank 
Australia 43.92 17.24 116.92 7.65 12.26 0.75 
 
Table 1: Liquidity, Debt, Capital and Profitability Ratios of UK and Australian Banks 
Source: Annual reports and author’s calculations 
 
The poor financial ratios are a reflection of weak corporate governance by Northern Rock 
and regulation/supervision by the FSA. They ultimately led to a liquidity problem and bank 
run at Northern Rock. The House of Commons Treasury Committee (2008) was critical of the 
FSA in both its roles as regulator and supervisor.  
 
As a supervisor, the FSA failed to allocate sufficient resources to monitor Northern Rock 
where its business model was unusual. It failed to supervise Northern Rock properly when it 
adopted an ambitious expansion policy and when its share price fell sharply in late 2007. 
With regards to human resources, the FSA should not have approved the Chairman and CEO 
of Northern Rock, as they were not qualified bankers. They have significant experience but 
running a big bank without suitable qualifications is a hazard. 
 
The FSA labelled Northern Rock as a ‘high impact bank, under close and continuous 
supervision’ (House of Commons Treasury Committee, 2008). However, the FSA only carried 
out an ARROW risk (Advanced Risk Responsive Operating Framework) assessment every 
three years. It acknowledged that the interval between assessments was ‘inadequate’ 
(House of Commons Treasury Committee, 2008). The FSA defended its position by stating 
that it maintained a close relationship with Northern Rock through ‘very regular 
dialogues...on a full range of supervisory issues’ (House of Commons Treasury Committee, 
2008). 
 
Although the main problem at Northern Rock was one of liquidity, the FSA weakened 
Northern Rock’s capital position by approving the Basel II waiver. This meant that Northern 
Rock was able to increase its dividends and so its balance sheet was weakened. Before the 
FSA approved the Basel II waiver, FSA reviewed Northern Rock’s stress-testing scenarios. 
The FSA was unhappy with the scenarios but it failed to relay that message to the directors 
of Northern Rock. It also failed to rectify the scenarios. 
 
The House of Commons Treasury Committee concluded that the tripartite system (Bank of 
England, FSA and HM Treasury) failed to work well. Northern Rock had to ask the Bank of 
England for emergency relief, since it was the lender of last resort. By separating the roles of 
banking supervision/regulation from lender of last resort, decision-making was slow and 
inefficient. The Bank of England was criticised for taking a reactive approach in the Northern 
Rock episode (Buiter, 2008 in House of Commons Treasury Committee, 2008). In 
comparison to the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank (ECB), the Bank of 
England was slow to act, arguing that injecting liquidity would create a risk of moral hazard 
(House of Commons Treasury Committee). Several banks asked the Bank of England for 
additional liquidity at no penalty rate in August 2007. The Bank of England was reluctant to 
provide more liquidity at different maturity dates against weaker collateral (House of 
Commons, 2008). It refused to engage in liquidity transformation. It was in mid September 
2007 when the Bank of England created a Liquidity Lending Facility for Northern Rock. Wood 
(2008, cited in House of Commons Treasury Committee, 2008) supports the Bank of 
England’s approach. In his view, the ECB and the Federal Reserve were wrong to adopt such 
a proactive policy and that it would lead to problems in the future. The House of Commons 
Treasury Committee concluded that whilst it was hard to tell whether the liquidity facility 
could have saved Northern Rock, the Bank of England should have broadened its range of 
collateral earlier in the crisis. The Bank of England did not take any contingency measures 
when the ECB and the Federal Reserve did. Overall, its conclusion was that rather than 
restructuring the tripartite system, the House of Commons Treasury Committee wanted to 
keep it but with clearer leadership and stronger powers. 
 
The FSA published its own review on Northern Rock in March 2008. According to the report, 
the extent of the problems at Northern Rock was a surprise to them. In the FSA’s view, 
Northern Rock was ‘at the extreme end of the spectrum’ that they observed. In terms of 
supervision, there was a lack of resources and experience in monitoring Northern Rock. 
Northern Rock was supervised by the insurance group of the Major Retail Groups Division 
until 2006. Three Heads of Departments were responsible for Northern Rock, although one 
of them was in practice for only three months (FSA, 2008, p.2). There was however, 
continuity in the manager and lead associate for supervising Northern Rock. The lead 
associate’s account clearly revealed that staff at the FSA were stretched during a busy 
period of takeovers, bids and demutualisation. The FSA pursued a policy of ‘fewer and 
better staff’ (FSA, 2008, p.7). It reduced its staff by about 20 between 2004 - 2008. As a 
result, Northern Rock was poorly supervised. The specific supervisory failures include: 
failure to update the internal risk database; no Risk Mitigation Plan for Northern Rock; 
insufficient engagement with the bank and long gaps between Close and Continuous 
meetings. 
 
Regulatory failures at Northern Rock are revealed in capital, liquidity and stress testing. 
When Northern Rock breached its capital position in March 2007, FSA took action to rectify 
the problem. However, there was no written record of a meeting between the FSA and 
Northern Rock representatives on the reasons of the breach. Lack of rigour and internal 
controls appear to have affected the FSA’s performance. These problems are manifested in 
regulating liquidity as well. When the FSA made an ARROW visit to Northern Rock in 
February 2006, they did not carry out a stress test even though liquidity was included was 
on the agenda. Although there were no material weaknesses in the liquidity management 
framework, the FSA admitted that more frequent checks on the data are required. The FSA 
has drawn up 39 lessons it had learnt from the Northern Rock episode. The seven high level 
recommendations include improvements to the rigour of day-to-day supervision; senior 
management to increase engagement with high impact firms; increase its focus on 
prudential supervision (including liquidity and stress testing); improve resources; improve 
the quality and resources of its financial and sectoral analysis and senior managers should 
increase their oversight of supervision. No dates have been set for these recommendations 
but the FSA will implement them as part of a wider programme. 
 
 
3. HBOS 
 
HBOS was formed in 2001 when Halifax Plc and the Governor and Company of the Bank of 
Scotland merged. At the end of 2006, HBOS was the fourth largest UK bank in terms of 
assets (Milne & Wood, 2009). According to the 2007 HBOS Annual Report, HBOS held 20% of  
the mortgage market and 16% of the savings market (HBOS, 2007, p.8). Like many other 
banks, HBOS experienced rapid growth between 2003-2008. Debt increased from £112 
billion in 2003 to £231 billion in 2007 and total assets increased from £408 billion in 2003 to 
£667 billion in 2007 (HBOS, 2007, p.14). HBOS experienced liquidity problems during the 
financial crisis. The Chief Executive of HBOS, Andy Hornby, admitted that ‘it is clear with the 
benefit of hindsight that, over many years of reliance on wholesale funding, that left us in a 
vulnerable position.’ (House of Commons Treasury Committee, 2007). The poor liquidity 
ratios revealed in Table 1 further corroborates the liquidity problem at HBOS. HBOS’s share 
price fell sharply in March 2008 after rumours of short-selling in the bank. FSA carried out a 
market rumours investigation. In August 2008, it confirmed that it did not find any evidence 
that rumours were spread as part of a concerted attempt by individuals to profit by 
manipulating the HBOS share price. It is commendable that the FSA took action as soon as 
possible.  
 
Despite the false allegation of short-selling, HBOS’s share price fell a further 18% on 15th 
September 2008 when Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy. Despite reassurance from 
HBOS that it has a strong capital base by Shane O’Riordain, the Group Communications 
Director of HBOS, the shareholders were not convinced and share price fell a further 22%. 
Emergency talks took place on 17th September 2008 between HBOS and Lloyds TSB. The 
Labour government was keen to avoid another Northern Rock scenario. It therefore relied 
on the argument of public interest, waived European competition law rules and approved 
the deal between Lloyds TSB and HBOS. On 18th September 2008, Lloyds TSB and HBOS 
announced that the latter would be takeover by Lloyds for £12.2 billion. 
 
HBOS failed due to a combination of weak corporate governance and poor regulation. The 
FSA first raised its concerns about HBOS back in 2003. They carried out a full ARROW risk of 
HBOS’s Retail, Corporate, Treasury and Group Functions. Due to limited resources at the 
FSA, they could only carry out a limited risk review in each division. They would then 
produce a ‘Risk Mitigation Plan’ for HBOS to follow (Moore, 2009). Moore explained that if 
the FSA suspects that there are key risks, they would ask HBOS or an external expert to carry 
out additional work and assess the risks. If the bank carries out the additional work, this will 
normally be assigned to one of the two Group Risk functions that existed at the bank, either 
Group Regulatory Risk or Group Financial and Operational Risk (Moore, 2009). In November 
2003, the FSA’s report was published. The report contains evidence that ‘…the risk posed by 
the HBOS Group to the FSA's four regulatory objectives is higher than it was perceived’. In 
relation to HBOS’s retail side at the Halifax, ‘there has been evidence that development of 
the control function in Retail Division has not kept pace with the increasingly sales driven 
operation…’ and ‘there is a risk that the balance of experience amongst senior management 
could lead to a culture which is overly sales focused and gives inadequate priority to risk 
issues.’ (Moore, 2009)  
 
The FSA’s ARROW visit in 2003 identified the key risks. Moore believed that ‘the operational 
staff at the FSA had done a good job on the ARROW visit they had conducted and that they 
almost certainly had identified the key risks at the bank at that stage in its development’ 
(Moore, 20010). He added that ‘staff [at the FSA] at that level would not be accountable for 
what happened at HBOS’. Nevertheless, in Moore’s interview with the author held in July 
2010, Moore was critical of the FSA. He stated that the FSA failed to supervise properly 
because it adopted a ‘light-touch’ approach to regulation and supervision. It failed in their 
statutory duties, which were to maintain market confidence, protect retail customers, fight 
financial crime and ensure proper consumer education. According to Moore (2010), the 
main failure of the FSA was that it failed to act upon the red flags.  
 
The FSA has not commissioned a report on HBOS. Instead, it issued a statement on 11th 
February 2009 in response to Moore’s allegations regarding HBOS’s regulatory failures in 
December 2004. According to the statement, the FSA conducted a full ARROW risk 
assessment in late 2002. It subsequently asked PricewaterhouseCoopers to carry out a 
‘skilled persons report’ in accordance with section 166 of the Financial Services and Markets 
Act 2000. The ‘skilled persons report’ revealed that HBOS needs to improve its risk 
management system. The FSA conducted another risk assessment of the entire HBOS 
Group, formally recording the assessment in December 2004. HBOS has made 
improvements in addressing the risks highlighted in the previous assessment. Nevertheless, 
the FSA was of the view that HBOS’s group risk functions needed to ‘enhance their ability to 
influence the business’ (FSA, 2009). It continued to monitor HBOS and wrote to HBOS again 
on 29th June 2006, expressing their concerns about control issues and the bank’s growth 
strategy. With regards to Moore’s allegation that the new group risk director was not ‘fit 
and proper’ for the job, HBOS commissioned KPMG to investigate. The FSA only appointed 
the new director when KPMG’s results showed that there was no evidence to suggest that 
the new group risk director was not ‘fit and proper’. The FSA also had a separate meeting 
with Moore to discuss this issue. The FSA concluded its statement by emphasising that it 
had already raised concerns about HBOS’s regulatory framework prior to Moore’s 
allegations. 
 
 
 
4. Changes on the horizon since the financial crisis 
The previous sections highlighted the weaknesses and failures of the tripartite system, in 
particular the FSA. Hector Sants, Chief Executive of the FSA, admitted that the FSA failed in 
both roles as regulator and supervisor. In his speech at the Annual Lubbock Lecture in 
Management Studies, Sants announced the changes that the FSA has made since the 
financial crisis (Sants, 2010). He stressed that the FSA is an ‘influencer’ of prudential roles, 
not a decision-maker. The majority of decision-making is set at the European and 
international level, so he appealed that the FSA should be judged according to the 
effectiveness of its supervision rather than the quality of the prudential regulations. On 
capital and liquidity, the FSA has put in place a liquidity and ‘interim’ capital regime.  This is 
consistent with the Basel Committee. On supervision, the FSA has shifted from a reactive 
‘principles-based’ approach to a proactive ‘outcomes-based’ approach. The new approach is 
more intensive. It focuses on stress-testing and on the future. Hence the forward-looking 
approach to capital for banks recently adopted by the FSA improved the capital positions of 
banks because a challenging stress test was used. The FSA will conduct annual stress test 
with all major financial institutions. This would involve reviews of their portfolios, 
projections and strategies. According to Sants, the structure of the regulator was not ‘a 
major contributory factor to the crisis’ (Sants, 2010). He acknowledged that there were 
deficiencies in the tripartite system but the status quo should be kept. The FSA has the ‘right 
people making the right decisions, and the right policies and rules in place to support that 
process’ (Sants, 2010). Further, the UK regulator’s role in regulation will be restricted in the 
future. Future regulatory policy and rules will be decided on the European level under the 
new European regulatory framework. This is an interesting point which deserves closer 
examination. 
 
On 1 January 2011, the new European financial supervisory framework came into force. The 
key features of the reform are the creation of a European Systemic Risk Board (‘ESRB’) and 
three European Supervisory Authorities (‘ESAs’) (the European Banking Authority (‘EBA’), 
the European Securities and Markets Authority (‘ESMA’) and the European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Authority (‘EIOPA’)). The ESRB is in charge of macro-prudential 
supervision. The ESRB will work with national authorities such as the Financial Policy 
Committee in the UK, which is the proposed new institution responsible for macro-
prudential regulation. The three ESAs will work under the European System of Financial 
Supervision (‘ESFS’) together with the existing national supervisory authorities. They are 
responsible for micro-prudential supervision. The Prudential Regulatory Authority (‘PRA’) 
will represent the UK in the new ESAs for banking and insurance, whilst the Consumer 
Protection and Markets Authority (‘CPMA’) will represent the UK in the ESMA. 
 
The ESAs have wide-ranging powers which include: drafting specific rules and guidelines for 
national authorities and financial institutions in the form of technical standards, guidelines 
and recommendations; and monitor how rules are being enforced by national regulators 
(they will in some circumstances be able to give binding instructions to national regulators 
and financial institutions); take action in emergencies, including the banning of certain 
products; mediate and settle disputes between national supervisors. 
 
Member states can decline to comply with a recommendation or guideline but technical 
standards will be binding as an EU regulation or decision. The regulatory paradigm will shift 
from the national to European level. The theoretical paradigm will become increasingly 
focused on vertical rather than horizontal regulatory co-operation. Horizontal regulatory co-
operation between the tripartite authorities failed under the UK single regulator. The first 
step that the UK government should take is to rectify the problems mentioned earlier in the 
paper before considering the overall structure of the regulator. Structure alone will not 
solve everything. The second step is to consider whether the Australian twin-peaks model is 
better for the UK. The European regulatory changes call for more vertical regulatory co-
operation between the national and European regulatory bodies. With the Bank of England 
and PRA reporting to the ESRB and ESFS, the twin-peaks model should in theory, be more 
aligned to the European level. 
 
5. Twin-peaks model 
 
George Osborne, the current Chancellor of the Exchequer, announced on 16th June 2010 
that the coalition government would reform the UK financial regulatory landscape. He 
recommended a shift from the single regulator to a ‘twin-peaks’ model on grounds that the 
tripartite system "failed spectacularly" in ensuring financial stability (BBC, 2010). The HM 
Treasury document of 2010: ‘A new approach to financial regulation: judgement, focus and 
stability’ explained that “The tripartite system of financial regulation failed to ensure 
financial stability - in particular by failing to identify the risk posed by the rapid and 
unsustainable increase in debt in the economy. This resulted in considerable economic costs 
in lost output and in a substantial deterioration in public finances. The regulatory system 
cannot be restructured without primary legislation.” (HM Treasury, 2010) The HM Treasury 
consultation document has raised a number of macro-prudential failures of the FSA. These 
include: - 
 
1. Failure to identify the problems that were building up in the financial system; 
2. Failure to take steps to mitigate the above problems; and 
3. Failure to deal adequately with the crisis when it did break, especially during the first part 
of the crisis in the summer of 2007. 
According to the HM Treasury consultation document 2010, the macro-prudential failures 
arose due to an ‘underlap’ of macro-prudential regulation. Whilst the rationale of the 
tripartite system is an ‘overlap’ of financial products and thus the phenomenon of 
‘functional despecialisation’ (Taylor, 2009), in reality, the structure of the tripartite system 
was weak. The FSA was given too much work and responsibility in relation to financial 
regulation. The Bank of England had nominal responsibility with little power or resources. 
The Treasury was ill prepared and equipped for crises. In addition to this dismal picture, the 
UK lacked a single institution which could deal with financial regulation as a whole. With an 
‘overlap’ of financial products and an ‘underlap’ of macro-prudential regulation, it is little 
wonder that the balance tipped in favour of financial innovation than stability. Together 
with the micro-prudential failures mentioned earlier in this paper, the HM Treasury 
consultation document 2010 states that micro-prudential regulation failed because of an 
over-reliance on a ‘tick-box’ compliance regime. There was a lack of thorough 
understanding of business models and risk analysis. 
Against this backdrop, it is therefore necessary to consider whether the UK government 
should adopt the twin-peaks model. According to the coalition government’s reform 
proposal, the Financial Policy Committee (FPC) will be responsible for macro-prudential 
regulation. It will be a subsidiary of the Bank of England. The FPC will comprise of bank 
executives and will have macro-prudential tools to regulate financial institutions. Micro-
prudential regulation will be the responsibility of the new Prudential Regulation Authority 
(PRA) will deal with prudential and financial regulation. The PRA will also be a subsidiary of 
the Bank of England. The Consumer Protection and Markets Authority (CPMA) will promote 
confidence in the financial markets. The main advantage of this proposal is that both macro 
and micro-prudential regulation is brought under one institution—the Bank of England. 
There is a consultation period on this reform proposal until end of 2011, with a view of 
legislating the proposal in 2012. Proponents of the twin-peaks model argued that the twin-
peaks model is better in times of crises. Having the lender of last resort and information 
gathered as the banking regulator would accelerate the decision-making process (Taylor, 
2009) Drawing on the Australian experience will assist policy makers in deciding which 
structure would work best for the UK. 
Australia adopted the twin-peaks model in 1998 following the Wallis Inquiry of 1996. The 
Wallis Inquiry was not a consequence of a scandal or crisis. Therefore, it can be argued that 
the Wallis Inquiry was free from political pressure when reviewing the regulatory structure 
(Cooper, 2006). Australia withstood the financial crisis of 2007-2009 better than the UK. No 
Australian bank failed. There were no mergers or acquisitions of weaker banks. The G30 
Report on the Structure of Financial Supervision of 2008 revealed that both Australia and 
the Netherlands are amongst the best and most effectively regulated regimes in the world 
(G30, 2008). It would appear that the twin-peaks model works very well in Australia. 
However, the failure of HIH Insurance Limited in 2001 illustrates the failures and 
weaknesses of the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA). HIH Insurance Limited 
was the second largest general insurance company in Australia. It collapsed with a debt in 
the region of $3.6 - $5.3 billion (Clark, 2007). The Royal Commission into HIH’s collapse 
found that the APRA was reluctant to intervene in HIH when the latter was in trouble. APRA 
was formed on 1st July 1998 and it was inexperienced in understanding the extent of HIH’s 
problems (Clark, 2007).  
 
Justice Owen of the Royal Commission held that APRA ‘did not cause or contribute to the 
collapse of HIH’ (HIH, 2003a). However, APRA ‘missed many warning signs, was slow to act, 
and made misjudgements about some vital matters.’ (HIH, 2003a) Justice Owen said that 
APRA was weak in a number of areas. First, APRA did not have staff with the relevant skills 
or experience. Resources were inadequate. Secondly, there was a lack of information flow 
upwards to APRA's board and managers. They were not properly informed on lack of 
resources or on HIH’s financial performance.  Thirdly, like the FSA, APRA adopted a ‘laissez-
faire’ approach to regulation. Although HIH’s collapse was ultimately due to corporate 
governance failures, this episode reveals that APRA could have dealt with the problem 
better.  
 
To rectify the weaknesses, Justice Owen made three recommendations. First, he 
recommended that the CEO and executive commissioners should replace the non-executive 
board of APRA. This should improve the information flow to the senior level. Secondly, he 
called for a restructuring of the APRA. Reorganisation is required to improve accountability. 
He also urged the creation of a specialist team of staff to supervise insurers. Finally, the 
APRA should be more firm and aggressive in its style of prudential regulation and 
supervision.  
 
APRA learnt from the experience and in October 2002, it introduced new risk assessment 
and supervisory response tools known as the Probability and Impact Rating System (PAIRS) 
and the Supervisory Oversight and Response System (SOARS). The HIH Insurance scenario 
illustrates that the APRA experienced teething problems in both regulation and supervision. 
Nevertheless, it has learnt from its experience and made the necessary changes. With no 
bank failure during the financial crisis of 2007-2009, it seems that the problems of 
regulatory co-ordination, information sharing and conflict of interests have not troubled the 
APRA again. The UK government could learn from this episode. If the twin-peaks model is 
adopted, the PRA needs to be well-organised and has skilled experts. There must be clear 
co-ordination and co-operation both within the regulatory bodies and outside. Transparency 
and accountability should be encouraged with good information flow upwards and 
downwards. It is encouraging to note that the coalition government will give the Treasury 
power to set out in secondary legislation the exact macro-prudential tools available to the 
Financial Policy Committee (HM Treasury, 2010). These tools are vital to detect risks and 
improve regulation and supervision.  
 
 
6. Findings and recommendations 
 
This paper has extended the literature on financial regulation by examining the macro and 
micro-prudential failures of the tripartite authorities, especially the FSA during the financial 
crisis of 2007-2009. It is important to emphasise that Northern Rock and HBOS failed due to 
a combination of corporate governance and regulatory failures. However, this paper focuses 
on the latter, especially the micro-prudential failures and weaknesses of the FSA. The 
purpose of this approach is to identify whether the weaknesses and failures are due to the 
structure of the FSA or other reasons. This will have important implications for the future of 
UK financial regulation. The author has found that there are weaknesses with the tripartite 
authorities.  
 
The Northern Rock demise has revealed that FSA failed in both regulating and supervising 
the bank. By waiving Basel II regulations on capital, Northern Rock was able to pay dividends 
to its shareholders and further weakening its capital position. The FSA was aware of the 
capital situation before it waived the Basel II requirements. However, it failed to channel 
that information to the board of Northern Rock and did not rectify the problem. It did not 
regulate the bank’s liquidity well. As a supervisor, it failed to monitor the bank properly 
when it was evident that Northern Rock’s business model was unusual. It carried out 
ARROW risk assessments every three years when it identified the bank as ‘a high impact 
bank, under close and continuous supervision’ (House of Commons, 2008). The admission 
by the FSA that Northern Rock was ‘at the extreme end of the spectrum’ is a clear indication 
that there were serious failures in both regulation and supervision by the FSA.  
 
Compared to Northern Rock, the regulation and supervision at HBOS were marginally better 
based on the evidence available. Moore’s evidence revealed that the operational staff at the 
FSA performed well (Moore, 2009). They had identified the major risks at HBOS. It was at 
the senior management level where problems emerged. The main failure was that the FSA 
failed to notice the warning signals. Arguably, the FSA could and should have done more 
about the problems at HBOS.  
 
The studies into the role of FSA in both Northern Rock and HBOS revealed similar 
weaknesses and failures. A thorough post-mortem analysis was conducted into Northern 
Rock by both the House of Commons Treasury Committee and the FSA, so more information 
is available in the public domain on this bank. Nonetheless, from the information available, 
it is apparent that common supervisory weaknesses include: insufficient engagement with 
the banks; lax information recording systems; failure at the senior management level and 
poor monitoring of the banks. Lack of resources and poor information flow were noticeable 
in both banks. Regulatory failures include capital, liquidity and stress testing. The FSA has 
been perceived as focusing more on capital and solvency rather than liquidity (Buiter, 2008 
cited in House of Commons, 2008). Both Northern Rock and HBOS ultimately needed 
government assistance because of liquidity problems. Therefore, the primary regulatory 
failure is in liquidity and stress testing.  
 
The demise of HIH Insurance Limited exposed initial problems of the twin peaks model in 
Australia. The APRA lacked skilled staff and resources. It failed to notice warning signals and 
was slow to act. There was poor communication and information flow. The APRA adopted a 
‘light-touch’ approach to regulation. These weaknesses are similar to the FSA. Therefore, 
the structural difference between the two regulators is not a key factor to their regulatory 
and supervisory failures. Rather, the regulators failed in both countries due to organisational 
and management weaknesses, especially at the senior management level. Should the UK 
maintain the single regulator and make improvements or move to the twin-peaks model? 
The status quo could be retained if the necessary recommendations are acted upon. 
Further, the Banking Act 2009 gives the tripartite authorities power to deal with failing 
banks in an emergency. It has thus given the FSA powers to stabilise banks but this is 
curative rather than preventative. Proximity between the Bank of England and the FSA will 
assist with preventative measures. When macro and micro-prudential 
regulation/supervision is vested within one umbrella organisation, the PRA can in theory, 
react quicker to market volatility and provide liquidity where necessary. Macro and micro-
prudential regulation/supervision are closely connected: ‘Macro-prudential supervision 
cannot be meaningful unless it can somehow impact on supervision at the micro-level; 
whilst micro-prudential supervision cannot effectively safeguard financial stability without 
adequately taking account of macro-level developments’ (de Larosiere, 2009). The proposed 
changes to the European regulatory framework suggest a regulatory emphasis on vertical 
co-operation. Lord Turner and de Larosiere both stressed the importance of good regulation 
on a global scale in their reports (Turner, 2009; de Larosiere, 2009). After all, global banks 
are ‘global in life but national in death’ (King, 2009, cited in Turner, 2009)  
 
Effective global financial regulation starts at home. Until the UK government has fully learnt 
and implemented the changes, the question of the structure of the regulator is of secondary 
importance. The structure only provides the outer shell of an organisation. It requires the 
necessary tools, equipment, resources, information and co-ordination to perform properly. 
It is evident from this paper that it is exactly these concerns that the UK regulator should 
address.  The Australian experience further supports the fact that the twin-peaks model 
does not resolve all the problems. 
 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
“New structures do not guarantee better regulation...Any country that thinks that tinkering 
with the structure of agencies will, by itself, fix past shortcomings is doomed to relive its 
past crises” (Carmichael, 2003) 
 
Moving to the twin-peaks model per se will not solve the failures and weaknesses of the FSA 
and the Bank of England. Rather, the UK government must learn from the experiences of 
Northern Rock, HBOS and Australia. It needs to rectify the problems revealed in the financial 
crisis. In view of the current economic climate and with a deficit of £1000.4 billion as at 
March 2010 (ONS, 2010), it is questionable whether the UK government should spend 
money on restructuring the UK regulator. Whilst the proximity of the Bank of England and 
the PRA and FPC under the twin-peaks model is attractive, this is of no benefit if the bodies 
differ in their opinions on rescuing banks. We do not know whether the FSA supported 
additional liquidity in the Northern Rock episode since they relied on the principle of 
confidentiality (House of Commons Treasury Committee, 2008). The delay in granting 
liquidity support to Northern Rock seems to suggest that there were differences in opinion 
between the tripartite authorities. Hence, the UK government should appeal for more co-
ordination and co-operation within the regulatory bodies, be it single or twin.  
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